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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
3STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant John Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment to the defendant state officials on Taylor’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.   Taylor is a Delaware prisoner and alleges in his complaint that his legal mail was
opened outside of his presence on eight occasions over a four-year period and that this
constitutes a pattern and practice of so doing.  Defendant Beatrice Oney works in the
prison mail room and may be in charge of the mail room.  Defendant Joe Hudson is a
supervisor for the mail room.  Defendant John Walsh is in charge of “support service” at
the prison, but has no particular involvement with the mail room.  Defendant Betty Burris
is the deputy warden and Defendant Robert Snyder is the warden. 
On one occasion after receiving opened legal mail, Taylor spoke with Oney.  She
told him that she “didn’t know how it [the opening of Taylor’s legal mail] happened but
she would guarantee [Taylor] that it won’t happen again, and probably somebody was
working in the mail room that day.”  App. at A-41-42.  Other undisputed evidence in the
record shows that Taylor does not know who opened his mail or what role, if any, the
defendants played in opening his mail.   
Taylor argued below that he has “a Constitutional right[] to have his incoming
legal mail open[ed] in his presence.”  Pl. Mot. Summ. J. at 2-3 (citing Bieregu v. Reno, 59
F.3d 1445, 1458-59 (3d Cir. 1995)).  He specifically argued that he “alleges a First
Amendment violation by prison officials for invading and interfering with his legal mail.” 
Pl.’s R. Br. Opp. Summ. J. at 4.  The District Court, on cross-motions for summary
4judgment, granted the defendants’ motion and denied Taylor’s.  The District Court
appeared to construe Taylor’s claim as solely one for violation of his right to court access,
and not for violation of his First Amendment right to free speech.  The Court ruled that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), had  effectively
overruled Bieregu, and that this overruling was recognized in the Third Circuit’s decision
in Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997).  Because Taylor had failed to prove
“actual injury” to his right to court access, as Casey requires for court-access claims, the
District Court dismissed Taylor’s claim.   
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact” such that “the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”  See Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharma. Lp., 401 F.3d 174, 179
(3d Cir. 2005).    
Taylor alleged below that a pattern and practice of opening his legal mail, contrary
to prison regulations, violated his Constitutional rights.  Even though his complaint and
papers on summary judgment, generously construed, fairly include a claim that the
pattern and practice violated his First Amendment right to free speech, the District Court
only considered his claim to be one for denial of court access.  On appeal, Taylor argues
that the District Court “did not consider the First Amendment free speech claim and if
there was a pattern and practice of deliberate interference or the intent  [sic] by the
defendants.”  Br. Appellant at 6.  He requests remand.  
5In a separate decision issued today we reaffirm our prior holding in Bieregu that
prison officials impinge upon the First Amendment rights of prisoners when they open
prisoners’ legal mail outside the presence of the addressee prisoner.  See Jones v. Brown,
No. 03-3823, slip. op. at        (3d Cir. Aug.    , 2006).  When bringing claims based on
such a violation, prisoners need not allege or prove any “actual injury” beyond the direct
injury to their First Amendment right to use the mails.  To the extent the District Court
ruled otherwise, this was error.  However, we nevertheless will affirm the District Court
on the alternative ground that Taylor has failed to produce evidence of personal
involvement on the part of the defendants in the alleged pattern and practice of opening
his mail.   
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Taylor failed to produce any
evidence of the personal involvement of any of the individual defendants in the opening
of his legal mail.  Taylor asserts in his briefing on appeal that Oney had “direct
participation in the alleged Constitutional violation” and was “personally involved and
responsible for the opening of [his] legal mail.”  R. Br. Appellant at 2.  He similarly
asserts that defendants Walsh and Hudson are responsible for the “creation and
maintenance of a policy under which the violations occurred” and are guilty of “gross
negligence in managing subordinates who committed the unconstitutional acts.”  Id.  He
further asserts that defendants Burris and Snyder are liable “for deliberate indifference for
6failing to act on information indicating that constitutional violations [were] occurring.” 
Id.  However, he points to no record support for any of these conclusory allegations.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment on the alternative
ground that Taylor failed to produce evidence of the personal involvement of the
defendants.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.
